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Abstract
This paper is one of the ￿rst to analyse political in￿uence on state-owned sav-
ings banks in a developed country with an established ￿nancial market: Germany.
Combining a large dataset with ￿nancial and operating ￿gures of all 457 German
savings banks from 1994 to 2006 and information on over 1,250 local elections during
this period we investigate the change in business behavior around elections. We ￿nd
strong indications for political in￿uence: the probability that savings banks close
branches, lay-o￿ employees or engage in merger activities is signi￿cantly reduced
around elections. At the same time they tend to increase their extraordinary spend-
ings, which include support for social and cultural events in the area, on average by
over 15%. Finally, we ￿nd that savings banks extend signi￿cantly more loans to their
corporate and private customers in the run-up to an election. In further analyses, we
show that the magnitude of political in￿uence depends on bank speci￿c, economical
and political circumstances in the city or county: political in￿uence seems to be
facilitated by weak political majorities and pro￿table banks. Banks in economically
weak areas seem to be less prone to political in￿uence.
Key words: savings banks, political in￿uence, government-owned banks, corporate
governance, political economy, state-owned enterprises, electoral cycle
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Government ownership of banks is still very common around the world as
La Porta et al. (2002) show. According to their ￿ndings on average over 40%
of the equity of the 10 largest banks in a country is owned by the govern-
ment. Thus, it is of great interest to understand how state-owned banks act
di￿erently from private banks. Insofar, Germany presents an excellent mar-
ket to study state-owned banks as approximately 50% of the banking market
with regard to both loan volume and total assets are controlled by the govern-
ment. 1 This is one of the highest share of state-owned banks among developed
countries. La Porta et al. (2002) distinguish two main objectives of govern-
ment ownership, the "development" and the "political" view. Whereas the
former argues that state-owned banks help to foster the local economy and
stabilize the ￿nancial system (see also Gerschenkron (1962)), the latter sees
state-owned banks rather as an instrument for politicians to ful￿ll their own
political agenda.
This paper focuses on the political view and tries to answer the question,
whether savings banks are prone to being in￿uenced from the representa-
tives of their government owner - the local politicians - with regard to their
political agenda. We combine detailed ￿nancial and operating data for all
German savings banks from 1994 to 2006 with information on local elections
on city/county level and analyse how the highly political event of an election
in￿uences the behavior of the local savings bank.
Despite numerous evidence in the academic literature on the negative relation-
ship between government ownership of banks and e￿ciency, economic growth
and the likelihood of bank crises, there is only little documented evidence on
politically in￿uenced behavior of banks. One of the only few articles to this
regard is Dinc (2005) that shows an increase in lending activities associated
with elections. However, Dinc (2005) ￿nds such evidence only for state-owned
banks in transition economies. This paper aims to provide - for the ￿rst time
- evidence for politically motivated behavior of banks in a developed country
with an established strong ￿nancial system.
Political in￿uence is not negative per se. To the contrary, although German
savings banks are pro￿t-oriented, i.e. they are expected to earn a decent pro￿t
at the end of the day, they speci￿cally do not aim to maximize their pro￿ts.
They rather follow a dual mission under which they have a public duty to
1 Total market includes the big commercial banks, savings banks, "Landesbanken",
cooperative banks and the central institutions of the cooperative banks. The focus
of this paper are savings banks only, which posses a market share of approximately
30%. Market share of savings banks based on number of customers is likely to be
signi￿cantly higher as their customer focus is on small and medium enterprises.
2ful￿ll, i.e. they are mandated to foster the local economy and support the
government in ful￿lling their political, social, cultural and economic agenda
for the city or county, which is in line with the "development" view. How-
ever, certain politically motivated actions have to be scrutinized carefully to
fully understand whether these actions are bene￿ting the public or rather the
respective politicians in their ambition to be reelected ("political" view). As
savings banks are owned by the local cities or counties potential ine￿ciencies
or misallocations due to political in￿uence are costly to the public as a whole.
In the vain of Dinc (2005) we argue that elections are major political events
that could lead local politicians to implicitly or explicitly exert in￿uence on
state-owned banks to act in a certain way that is assumed to increase the prob-
ability of their (re-)election. In this paper we analyse whether savings banks
tend to behave di￿erently in the context of local elections. Based on a unique
data set that includes more than 1,250 observed elections between 1994 and
2006 we ￿nd evidence for such a change in behavior in the context of local
elections, thus providing strong indications for political in￿uence. Speci￿cally,
we show that German savings banks are less likely to close branches, lay-o￿
employees and engage in mergers around elections. Furthermore, during these
periods, savings banks tend to spend more money on extraordinary activities
and grant more loans to both corporate and private customers. To derive pol-
icy implications it is of great importance to understand whether all savings
banks are in￿uenced by politics alike or whether some are more prone to be-
ing in￿uenced than others. To shed light on this question we conduct further
analyses to understand more of the circumstances facilitating political in￿u-
ence. We ￿nd that political in￿uence tends to be higher if political majorities
in the particular city or county are tight and the banks are more pro￿table.
Surprisingly, it seems to be lower in economically weak areas.
The main contribution of this paper to the literature of politically motivated
in￿uence on banks is twofold: ￿rstly, to our knowledge this is the ￿rst research
to document political in￿uence on banks for a developed country with a strong
legal system. Secondly, our detailed proprietary data set allows us not only to
show the impact on lending activities (as in Dinc (2005)) more carefully but
also to investigate other behavioral changes than lending activities: number
of employees, branch closures, merger activities or extraordinary spendings.
Political in￿uence on these dimensions is even more intuitive as its impact
with voters is more direct.
Furthermore, a relatively large sample size over a longer time period of 13 years
- including on average three elections in the same electoral district - provides
more observations than other papers in this area and, thus, a more reliable
base for such an analysis. 2 As all observations stem from one country, they
2 The observation period of Dinc (2005), e.g., is only half as long (1994-2000) and
3are all based on the same election system and the same legal and regulatory
background. Thus, they are highly comparable and the potential problem of
omitted variables is signi￿cantly smaller than in cross-country studies.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 provides a short overview of the
relevant literature. section 3 continues with some background information on
the German savings bank sector for readers that are less familiar with the
German banking market. Section 4 lays down the methodological approach
taken and section 5 introduces the used dataset. Section 6 provides the results
of the main analyses conducted, which are augmented by further analyses in
section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Overview
More recent work on state-owned enterprises includes La Porta et al. (2002),
Shleifer (1998), and Shleifer and Vishny (1994). 3 These papers contrast the
"development" and the "political" view of government ownership. The "de-
velopment" view states that state-owned enterprises help to overcome market
failures, especially in cases where social bene￿ts (external e￿ects) make certain
otherwise unpro￿table or risky projects desirable for the society as a whole.
State-owned banks, for example, might help to foster the local economy by
granting loans to risky startups that would not be able to obtain a loan from
a private bank. In contrast, the "political" view suggests that politicians are
primarily focused on achieving their own personal objectives rather than maxi-
mizing social welfare. In this regard, arguably the most important single goal of
a politician is to maintain voting support (Sapienza, 2004). As a result politi-
cians might in￿uence state-owned enterprises in their realm to act in ways
that are in the politicians’ own interest, i.e. that increases their voting sup-
port at upcoming elections (Stiglitz and Atkinson, 1980; Boycko et al., 1996).
Current research primarily points into the direction of the "political" view.
La Porta et al. (2002), for example, who study explicitly the consequences of
government ownership on banks in a cross-country study ￿nd that a higher
degree of government ownership is associated with slower economic and ￿nan-
cial development in the respective country. 4 So far, however, evidence for the
includes less than half the number of electoral districts (in their case countries),
which results in only 2,058 observations compared to over 5,400 for the analyses
presented in this paper.
3 There is a wide range of further literature on the e￿ects of state-owned banks,
which we cannot discuss in this context, e.g. Berger et al. (2005), An et al. (2007),
Iannotta et al. (2007) or Altunbas et al. (2001).
4 Despite some e￿ort researchs regularly fail to provide evidence of a positive e￿ect
of state-ownership on the ￿nancial and economic development (Barth et al., 2000,
4"political" view of state-ownership is mainly indirect and based on lower e￿-
ciencies of state-owned enterprises or a less favorable economic and ￿nancial
development in countries with a higher share of state-owned enterprises.
There is only a small and relatively recent strand of literature providing di-
rect evidence for the link between political motivation and business behavior
of state-owned enterprises, in particular banks. It is the purpose of our paper
to contribute to this literature by providing further indications of concrete
political in￿uence. One of the major papers in this area is Dinc (2005). He
analyses the impact of the electoral cycle on the lending behavior of state-
owned versus privately owned banks in a cross-country study among the ten
largest banks of each of 43 countries between 1994 and 2000. Controlling
for macroeconomic and bank speci￿c e￿ects he ￿nds strong support for the
hypothesis that state-owned banks grant additional loans before upcoming
elections. A closer look at this e￿ect, however, reveals that the ￿nding holds
only for emerging market countries in the sample and remains insigni￿cant
for developed economies. Closely related, Cole (2007) demonstrates that agri-
cultural lending in India is extented by an additional 10% in election years.
He further ￿nds that political in￿uence is particularly strong in regions where
political majorities are weak. In another cross-country study among emerging
market economies Brown and Dinc (2005) analyse the impact of the electoral
cycle on the probability of government interventions in connection with bank
failures. They ￿nd that a potentially costly government intervention, i.e. a
public takeover or revoking the banking license, is signi￿cantly less likely to
happen in the 12 months before an election. Other recent studies provide more
evidence for political in￿uence on banks in developing countries. For example,
Micco et al. (2007) ￿nd that the performance of state-owned banks in devel-
oping countries is signi￿cantly lower than that of private and foreign banks
in these countries. A main contribution of their research is evidence that this
performance gap widens considerably during election years. In a similar fash-
ion Khwaja and Mian (2005) and Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) show that
politically connected ￿rms obtain more and riskier ￿nancing from state-owned
banks in Pakistan and Indonesia, respectively, whereas they do not receive any
such bene￿ts from private banks.
To the best of our knowledge there are only three papers that provide evidence
for political in￿uence on the business behavior of state-owned banks among
mature banking markets: Sapienza (2004), Illueca et al. (2008) and Memmel
and Stein (2005). Sapienza (2004) analyses the lending behavior of Italian
state-owned banks and ￿nds that stated-owned banks charge lower interest
rates than their private counterparts. Introducing local electoral results into
her analysis, she ￿nds strong evidence for the "political" view: the stronger
the political party in the particular area, the lower the average interest rates.
2004; Berger et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2004).
5Illueca et al. (2008) analyse the impact of political in￿uence on the lending be-
havior of Spanish savings banks during the nationwide expansion phase from
1996 to 2004 that followed the deregulation of local branching restrictions in
1988. Based on a large data set including individual loans they show that sav-
ings banks with regional politicians on their board of directors tend to expand
faster outside their local market than their peers that have only local politi-
cians on their board. They provide further evidence for politically motivated
in￿uence by showing that the probability of granting loans and the share of
loans granted in other regions outside the home market decreases if the po-
litical parties in power of the two regions di￿er, i.e. savings banks tend to
expand foremost into regions where the "political distance" is small. Based on
individual loan data Illueca et al. (2008) further show that savings banks with
regional politicians on their board tend to grant ex ante riskier loans to ￿rms
outside their home markets but within their region than their peers. This hints
that some of the loans are rather politically than economically motivated.
The only paper to our knowledge investigating political in￿uence on state-
owned banks particularly in Germany is Memmel and Stein (2005). 5 The
authors reveal the di￿erences in lending behavior with regard to corporate
loans between private and state-owned banks, speci￿cally the state-owned
"Landesbanken". In line with the explicit public duty of these banks they ￿nd
that state-owned banks grant loans to corporates with lower creditworthiness
than their private counterparts. Furthermore they ￿nd that the probability of
granting a loan increases with the local unemployment rate and if the borrower
is headquartered in the same state as the bank. Both results provide evidence
that these banks ful￿ll their objective to support the local economy. In a sec-
ond analysis, however, Memmel and Stein (2005) also ￿nd evidence for direct
political in￿uence. The likelihood of granting a loan increases signi￿cantly the
longer the state government has held power but decreases if the state-owned
bank is owned by more than one state.
A further theoretical paper that should be mentioned in the context of political
in￿uence on banks is Hainz and Hakenes (2007). The authors develop an
extensive theoretical model to compare the e￿ciency of di￿erent options a
politician has to subsidize local ￿rms. They ￿nd that using state-owned banks
is more e￿cient than other ways like direct subsidies, for example. This work
provides a thorough theoretical explanation why state-owned banks are prone
to politcally motivated in￿uence.
Closely related there is some work on the political in￿uence on corporates
5 Another paper in this context is Kle￿ and Weber (2007) who reveal a positive
relation between the amount of dividends paid out by a savings bank and the in-
debtness of its government owner. Although, this is evidence of behavior in￿uenced
by politics it is most likely not motivated by the personal political agenda of the
local politicians but rather by the interest of the community or city as a whole.
6in general. For example, Goldman et al. (2006) show for the US that the
announcement of a politically connected new board member yields abnormal
returns for the shares of the respective ￿rm. Furthermore, shares of ￿rms with
predominantly Republican members generated abnormal returns follwing the
2000 election victory of the Rebublican party in the USA. Bertrand et al.
(2004) show that politically connetced corporates in France tend to employ
more people and discard less during election years. They ￿nd this e￿ect to be
particularly pronounced in highly contested elections. 6
Besides Illueca et al. (2008), who also look into branch expansion, there is - to
the best of our knowledge - no literature analyzing politically motivated in￿u-
ence on bank businesses other than lending activities such as closing branches,
reducing the number of employees and spending money in extraordinary ac-
tivities.
3 Overview of the German savings bank sector
Germany’s ￿nancial system is characterized by a universal banking system
where banks are allowed to pursue all types of ￿nancial activities (Hackethal,
2004). 7 As a result, no clear specialization among banks has emerged and all
banks and savings banks o￿er the complete range of ￿nancial services. The
market comprises of three main types of banks: cooperative banks, savings
banks and private commercial banks. Roughly 20% of the banks belong to
the savings bank sector. In terms of business volume the state-owned savings
bank sector controls nearly half of the market. As table 1 shows, by the end
of 2006 over 47% of total loans where granted by savings banks and 49% of
total deposits collected by them. Thus, they play a dominant role in providing
the economy and the society as a whole with loans and banking services. It is
important to note that savings banks do not pursue strictly pro￿t maximizing
objectives as they also aim to support the welfare of their region 8
All savings banks are members of one of the 12 regional savings banks asso-
ciations, which represent their interests on a regional and national level, and
act as auditors for the banks in their realm. They are furthermore member of
6 Other research so far merely shows the value of political connections in countries
with weak legal systems, e.g. Fisman (2001), Faccio (2006), Faccio et al. (2006).
7 A comprehensive overview of the German banking system and its peculiarities can
be found in Krahnen and Schmidt (2004).
8 The savings bank law of the state of Baden-W￿rttemberg, for example, states that
it is the objective of savings banks to provide the local economy and its inhabitants
with loans and other ￿nancial services. Furthermore they are expected to support
the local government with regard to its economical, social and cultural plans for the
area.
7Table 1
Market shares in Germany by bank type
Total loan volume, total deposit volume and total business volume denoted in EUR billions. Savings banks
group includes savings banks and state banks ("Landesbanken"), Cooperative banks group includes coop-
erative banks and their two central ￿nancial institutions, Commercial banks includes the ￿ve nation wide
operating commercial banks, private regional banks and branches of foreign banks.
Savings
banks group
Cooperative
banks group
Commercial
banks
Total
Number of banks 458 1,234 260 1,952
Market share 23.5% 63.2% 13.3% 100.0%
Total loan volume 1,132,836 402,338 858,041 2,393,215
Market share 47.3% 16.8% 35.9% 100.0%
Total deposits non-banks 647,153 304,279 370,001 1,321,433
Market share 49.0% 23.0% 28.0% 100.0%
Total business volume 2,632,161 894,935 2,257,813 5,784,909
Market share 45.5% 15.5% 39.0% 100.0%
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank
the German Savings Banks Association ("DSGV"), which is the main repre-
senative on a national and supranational level. These associations foster the
savings banks network and help to setup centralized services, e.g. IT. Note,
however, that all banks are own legal entities, which are absolutely free in
their business decisions.
The governance structure of savings banks consists of three main entities 9 :
the managing board running the day-to-day business, the supervisory board
(so called "Verwaltungsrat") controlling the management and deciding on key
personnel and major strategic matters as well as the credit committee approv-
ing individual loans exceeding a certain volume. Two thirds of the members
of the supervisory board are representatives of the bank’s government owner,
e.g. the local county or city. In most cases these are politicians of the respec-
tive local parliaments. By law, the chair of the supervisory board is held by
the head of the local government, i.e. the mayor or the head of the county. As
the supervisory board not only controls but also appoints the management,
there is a very close link between politics and the bank’s management. Fur-
ther important duties of the supervisory board in the context of this paper are
approving openings and closures of branches, deciding on the distribution of
pro￿ts and approving potential mergers with other savings banks. The credit
committee is a further channel of political in￿uence as it is mainly formed by
members of the supervisory board, i.e. local politicians. The chair of the credit
committee is held by the chair of the supervisory board, i.e. the head of the
local government. (skl, 2005; Hackethal, 2004)
9 The legal basis is provided by the savings bank law, which sets the general frame-
work for founding and operating a savings bank. These laws are state-laws but do
not di￿er substantially among states.
8Besides these two institutional ways of political in￿uence anecdotal evidence
suggests that there are strong informal ways of in￿uence as well. As both, the
CEO of the savings bank as well as the mayor or head of the county, are im-
portant representatives of the local public life, they frequently meet each other
at other occasions as well, e.g. cultural events, sport events, social clubs or
party meetings if they are member of the same political party 10 . Furthermore,
at the time of an election they have been knowing each other for at least 5
years, one legislative period - most likely for much longer through their party
a￿liation and their former roles within the city or county. These strong per-
sonal relationships between the main local politicians and the management of
the savings bank might occasionally be even more powerful than the formally
established links.
It is important to note that savings banks follow a self-imposed demarcation
of their business areas: they conduct business only with customers from their
local area and, thus, do not compete with other savings banks. 11 Their area of
business is the same as the electoral district of the respective local politicians
sitting on the supervisory board.
4 Methodology
There are two main methodological challenges associated when aiming to
demonstrate political in￿uence (Dinc, 2005): ￿rstly, one has to ￿nd a way
to single out politically motivated changes in bank behavior. To do so, we
follow Dinc (2005) and focus on local elections. Elections are probably the
most important political events in the career of politicians as they are the
key to political power. Thus, changes in the behavior of local savings banks
that can be attributed to upcoming elections are clear evidence for politically
motivated in￿uence. Secondly, we have to make sure that observed changes
around elections are not triggered by any other events that coincide with the
elections. We do so by including an extensive set of explanatory variables to
control for changes within the bank and the city or county. Furthermore, the
panel structure of our data set allows to control for bank and time speci￿c
￿xed e￿ects. The robustness of the analysis is further strengthend by the fact
that elections are held in di￿erent years in di￿erent cities or counties. This
also eliminates the potential impact of year speci￿c country wide e￿ects.
Ideally, we would compare the business behavior of savings banks with the
10 Which is very likely as the supervisory board appoints the CEO.
11 Some competition might arise over customers living on the boarder of two di￿erent
business areas, commuters between regions or bigger businesses with operations in
several cities or counties. However, this can be neglected in practice.
9behavior of private banks in the area. Unfortunately, there are almost no
local private banks in Germany and data from the big nation wide operating
commercial banks is not available on a local (branch) level. However, there is
no reasonable argument why private banks should behave di￿erently during
election years on a local level as all private banks follow centralized guidelines
from their headquarters and as local politicians have no formal in￿uence on
the business of private banks.
We investigate the impact of political in￿uence on ￿ve di￿erent dependent
variables and use two di￿erent methodologies depending on the nature of
the variable to be explained: to determine the impact of elections on branch
closures, change in the number of employees and merger activities we use a
￿xed e￿ect probit model to ￿nd out whether the probability of these actions
signi￿cantly deviates during an election year from other years. The depen-
dent variables are dummies indicating whether branch closures, an increase
or decrease in the number of employees or mergers have taken place in the
particular year. For the two other dependent variables of interest, the amount
of extraordinary spendings and the growth in loan volumes, we use OLS ￿xed
e￿ect regression. 12 These ￿ve dependent variables are the major ￿ve variables
in our data set which are of great public interest, and thus prone to political
in￿uence. There might be further variables of political interest for which we do
not possess the necessary data and, thus, leave their investigation to further
research. We estimate the following equation:
yit = α + β ∗ Electionit + γ ∗ xit + θt + ui + ǫit (1)
Where yit denotes the respective dependent variable, Electionit is a dummy
variable indicating whether the particular year is an election year, xit is a
vector with control variables, θt a year dummy, ui the bank speci￿c ￿xed
e￿ect, α the constant and ǫit the error term. We use robust standard errors
for our OLS ￿xed e￿ect regressions.
In general, we de￿ne the election year Electionit as the calendar year of the
election if the election is held in the second half of the year and as the calendar
year prior to the election if the election is held in the ￿rst half (Dinc, 2005). In
the case of changes in the number of employees we include also the calendar
year after the adjusted election year as redundancies can take up to 9 to
12 month until they are re￿ected in the o￿cial records. Similarly, mergers
take normally a year between announcement and o￿cial completition of the
12 We also used pooled probit and OLS models for robustness and ￿nd qualitatively
the same results. Dinc (2005) points out that with regard to the growth in loan
volume some of the variables are only sequentially exogenous as a change in credit
volume in￿uences the bank speci￿c explanatory variables as the equity ratio or bank
size. As these changes are relatively small we neglect this potential bias here.
10transaction. Thus, we only include the year after the adjusted election year in
this analysis.
We ￿rst run the regressions on the whole sample to show the di￿erent behavior
of savings banks during election years. In section 7 we split the sample with
regard to political, bank speci￿c and local characteristics to understand more
about the circumstances that facilitate political in￿uence.
In all regressions we use a set of standard control variables and augment
this set with further controls speci￿c to the di￿erent analyses. General bank
speci￿cs include the logarithm of total assets to control for bank size 13 , the
year-on-year growth of total assets to take the banks general trajectory into
account, operating expenses over total assets to control for e￿ciency, loan
loss reserves over total assets to control for the riskiness of the loan portfolio,
return on assets as measure for pro￿tability. The local market structure is
proxied by the Hirschman-Her￿ndahl-index based on the number of branches
in each county or city. 14 To account for macroeconomic di￿erences across
counties and cities we include a dummy variable Weak area, which indicates
that the county or city belongs to the lowest quartile with regard to its GDP
per capita. 15 Similarly, we include a dummy variable Rural area indicating
the lowest quartile regarding the population density. Furthermore, we add
GDP growth 16 to control for the general trend of the local economy. The
appendix contains a list describing all explanatory variables in detail as well
as a correlation matrix resolving any concerns about multicollinearity among
explanatory variables.
In total, Germany comprises 313 counties and 116 independent cities, which
do not belong to any county but have similar rights and tasks as counties. If
a savings bank operates in more than one city or county, we include only the
city or county where the particular bank is headquartered. 17
13 E.g. Dinc (2005).
14 More accurate concentration measures such as the HHI over loan volumes cannot
be calculated as such data is not available for the local branches of the nation wide
operating commercial banks.
15 E.g. Dinc (2005) also uses GDP per capita to control for the economic situation
in the county or city.
16 E.g. Dinc (2005) uses GDP growth as well to test for robustness of the results.
17 This does not pose a problem as all counties/cities in one state hold elections on
the same day and no savings banks operate in more than one state.
115 Data
To analyze whether savings banks change their business behavior in the con-
text of local elections, we combine four main data sets: one with detailed
￿nancial and operating data for all savings banks, one containing information
on the timing and outcome of all local elections, one with local macroeconomic
data and a fourth one including information on all mergers during the obser-
vation period from 1994 to 2006. The data set includes all 457 savings banks
resulting in a total of 5,941 observations.
The data with ￿nancial and operational ￿gures of the banks is a proprietary
data set obtained from the German Savings Banks Association’s ("DSGV")
annual Bank Performance Comparison. Balance sheet data is calculated as an-
nual averages of monthly data to permit the combination with annual pro￿t
and loss account data to calculate according ratios. The panel is balanced
since the DSGV integrated backwards ￿nancial accounts of savings banks that
merged during the observation period. 18 To rule out any potential survivor-
ship e￿ects on our regression results, we conducted all analyses excluding
merged banks and ￿nd results unchanged. The sample contains all 457 incum-
bent savings banks in Germany at year-end 2006.
To obtain the necessary information on elections we manually compiled a
unique data set of all election data in over 440 counties and cities for the period
since 1994. The raw data was provided by the 16 state bureaus of statistics.
As table 2 shows 1,264 local elections were held during the observation period
from 1994 to 2006. This re￿ects the average legislative period of 5 years for
local parliaments and results in more than three elections per savings bank
on average. 19 Note that we de￿ne election years as the calendar year prior to
the election if the election takes place in the ￿rst half of the calendar year.
Although there are elections being held in every year, they are not evenly
distributed over the years, because local elections are often held at the same
time as state or federal elections.
The local macroeconomic data was also provided by the statistical bureaus of
the states and is available also on county and city level, respectively. 20
Descriptive statistics for the main variables are provided in table 3. Although
18 E.g. if savings bank A absorbed bank B in 2000 the accounts of the two single
institutions A and B before 2000 are added up in the data set and reported as
accounts of bank A.
19 Some small states still had a legislative period of only 4 years at the beginning of
the obervation period.
20 As data on local GDP and population was only available until 2004, we extrapo-
lated the time series to obtain ￿gures for 2005 and 2006.
12Table 2
Overview of elections on county/city level during observation period 1994-2006
Elections is the number of elections held on county or city level. It is de￿ned as the calendar
year of the election if the election was held in the second half of the year and as the calendar
year prior to the election year if the election was held in the ￿rst half of the year. Strong
majority is the number of elections where either one of the two major parties (CDU or SPD)
obtained more than 50% of the votes (absolute majority). Weak majority is the number of
elections where the di￿erence in votes between the two major parties was less than 15%.
Year Elections Strong majority
Weak ma-
jority
Total CDU SPD
1994 267 42 23 19 64
1995 78 5 5 0 8
1996 74 8 3 5 32
1997 27 0 0 0 19
1998 11 0 0 0 1
1999 269 68 65 3 50
2000 28 7 1 6 14
2001 129 27 27 0 23
2002 21 16 16 0 0
2003 14 0 0 0 4
2004 266 42 41 1 39
2005 28 2 1 1 13
2006 52 2 1 1 16
Total 1264 219 183 36 283
all savings banks follow the same basic operating model, o￿er similar products
and cater to the same general type of customers, the size of the institutions
di￿ers signi￿cantly from small local banks with only a few hundred millions in
total assets to sizeable regional banks with total assets exceeding ten billion
Euros. The same holds true with regard to pro￿tability with the highest quar-
tile being more than twice as pro￿table as the lowest quartile as measured
by the return on total assets. More than 40% di￿erence between the GDP
per capita in the lowest and the highest quartile reveals a similar diversity
between cities and counties.
13Table 3
Descriptive statistics variables 1994-2006
Variable Mean Median Min Max SD N
Bank speci￿cs
Total assets 1,958 1,202 84 33,799 2,658 5941
Growth total assets 3.41 3.13 -31.03 102.54 4.12 5484
Operating expenses / total assets 2.05 2.06 0.78 3.37 0.27 5941
Loan loss reserves / total assets 3.47 3.36 0.03 9.82 1.38 5941
Return on assets incl. extraord. exp. 0.59 0.56 -3.97 2.90 0.35 5935
Return on assets excl. extraord. exp 0.78 0.75 -3.73 3.12 0.38 5930
Equity ratio 4.36 4.25 1.98 9.13 0.95 5941
Deposit-to-loan ratio 133.95 116.87 43.21 595.87 59.78 5022
Employees / branch 13.07 11.79 2.31 52.40 6.02 5927
Total assets / branch 57 48 8 321 33 5927
Accounts / employees 644 636 33 1,099 97 4911
Growth total loans* 2.67 2.27 -52.89 81.63 5.53 4554
Growth corporate loans* 1.63 1.13 -79.08 83.68 9.57 4554
Growth private loans* 4.20 3.68 -69.82 96.55 8.34 4554
Extraord. spendings / total assets* 0.19 0.15 -0.02 2.25 0.16 5936
Market structure
Market concentration (HHI) 0.20 0.19 0.09 0.53 0.06 5941
Macroeconomics
GDP / inhabitant 24,116 22,200 9,538 77,146 9,168 5939
GDP growth 2.08 2.05 -15.98 25.48 2.96 5482
Population density 0.54 0.24 0.04 4.13 0.66 5863
Interest rates 3.60 3.50 2.26 5.40 0.94 5941
Note: Asterix denotes dependent variables.
6 Results
In the following section we will present the results of our primary analyses
that provide evidence of how savings banks change their business behavior in
the context of upcoming elections in their city or county. We try to address
all business decisions that have a plausible political component, i.e. which are
of interest for the public and, thus, might be a relevant topic in the politi-
cal discussions surrounding an election campaign. First, we look into branch
closures. Savings banks have signi￿cantly consolidated their branch network
during the observation period. From 1994 to 2006 the number of total branches
declined by over 25% from 18,851 to 13,766, reducing the average number of
branches per bank from 41 to 30 (adjusted by merger related e￿ects) resulting
in on average signi￿cantly larger branches. However, anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that branch closures are unpopular with both, employees and customers
alike. Thus, we expect to ￿nd less branch closures during election years. Sec-
ond, in their e￿ort to reduce cost, savings banks started to follow their private
14peers and released some of their sta￿. During the observation period total
sta￿ employed fell by some 10%. As savings banks are often an important lo-
cal employer providing many highly quali￿ed and well paid jobs, redundancies
become part of the public debate quickly. Here, we also expect less redun-
dancies during election years than in other years. We even expect a higher
probability of additional jobs created during an election year and test for this.
Third, there has been an unprecedented merger wave among German savings
banks during the last decade: our sample includes 206 mergers since 1994
leaving only 457 banks per end of 2006. Again, planned mergers can be of po-
litical concern. Especially the city or county with the smaller bank might loose
some of its in￿uence and mergers in general go along with branch closures and
job losses. For this reason we do expect less bank mergers around elections.
Fourth, savings banks spend a signi￿cant amount annually on supporting lo-
cal cultural and societal activities and institutions. 21 All these spendings are
subsumed under "extraordinary expenses". If local politicians were able to
in￿uence the behavior of "their" savings bank, we should observe an increase
in these spendings during election years. Fifth, savings banks are the main
provider of loans to both private and corporate customers. As a healthy econ-
omy is one of the most crucial topics in an election campaign, we expect that
politicians will push for a generous provision of capital to both private in-
dividuals and corporates to make sure that local investment projects can be
undertaken, which further the local economy and potentially create jobs. Keep
in mind that due to the restricted business areas all business and, hence, all
lending is conducted only within the city or county, which controls the savings
bank. Thus, growth in loan volumes should be higher around elections in these
cities and counties than in other years.
6.1 Dynamics
Figure 1 depicts the development of the four variables of interest excluding
merger activities over time and compares the respective values for banks that
are in an election year with these that are not in an election year. Overall one
can see that the solid line, which represents banks in an election year, is above
the dashed line in most of the observations. This indicates that savings banks
act di￿erently during election years as predicted in the previous paragraph. In
the aftermath of the ￿nancial crises in 2001 we observe some disruption to this
pattern in all four graphs. Although the graphical univariate representation
of the relationship between election years and key business indicators is not
clear cut it provides a good ￿rst impression of political in￿uence.
21 Note that it is a speci￿c objective of savings banks (laid down in their charter)
to support the government in ful￿lling the economic, cultural and social agenda for
the local area.
15Figure 1. Comparing election years and non-election years
The graph in the upper left corner shows that branches have been reduced
throughout the observation period with especially strong cuts of approxi-
mately 6% during the years of recession from 2001 to 2003. Besides 2000
and 2002, banks associated with ongoing elections always closed less branches
than their peers. The upper right graph reveals that the majority of job cuts
during the observation period took place after 2001. Only in 2003 banks in
an election year cut more jobs than others. Extraordinary expenses as per-
centage of total assets nearly doubled from 1994 to 2006 (bottom left graph).
In only three years the spending is lower for banks in election year. Finally,
the bottom right graph shows a strong drop in loan volume growth with even
negative numbers in 2004. Evidence for political in￿uence is less clear here as
growth of loan volume of banks in election years has been below the rates of
the other banks in half of the observations.
However, this univariate look might be misleading as it cannot capture the
potential interaction between bank behavior, elections, other bank characteris-
tics and local characteristics that might have cumulative or alleviative e￿ects.
The next subsection sheds some more light on political in￿uence by controlling
for these e￿ects in proper multivariate regression analyses.
166.2 Determinants
Branch closures
As discussed in section 4 we use a ￿xed e￿ect probit model to evaluate in
more detail whether the likelihood of branch closures is lower during election
years. 22 The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the number
of branches for the particular bank is lower than in the previous year. Thus,
we only observe net changes in the number of branches. 23 Table 4 contains
our results.
Column (1) depicts the core relationship between elections and the probability
of branch closures. As expected the sign is negative and highly signi￿cant, i.e.
the probability of a branch closure is signi￿cantly lower around elections than
during other years. Calculating the associated probabilities yields that the
likelihood of a branch closure decreases by approximately 18%. As we add
more control variables the sign remains negative and signi￿cant.
In column (2) we add bank speci￿c controls. Signs of all coe￿cients are as
expected. We ￿nd that bigger banks are more likely to close branches than
smaller banks. However, faster growing banks are closing fewer branches. In-
tuitively, banks with higher operating cost relative to total assets are more
likely to close branches. This goes along with a negative relationship between
pro￿tability and branch closures. In sum, more pro￿table and e￿cient banks
are less likely to close further branches, which could merely re￿ect that they
thinned out their branch network already in previous years. Furthermore, we
speci￿cally check for the average size of the branch as one might argue in
line with Benston (1965) that savings banks with many small branches might
be able to reap greater economies of scale from branch closures and, thus, are
more likely to close branches than banks with bigger branches. 24 Two di￿erent
measures - "total assets/branch" (column (3)) and "employees/branch" (col-
umn (4)) - are applied. Interestingly enough, none of them is signi￿cant. There
is a slight positive relation with market concentration indicating that savings
banks more often close branches if they run a higher share of all branches in
22 As the number of branch openings is neglectable in our sample, we only consider
branch closures in the analysis.
23 From anecdotal evidence we know that branch closures in one area and an opening
in another is very rare and can be neglected.
24 Benston (1965) analyses regional banks in New England and ￿nds that banks of
similar size but more branches incur higher operating cost that are not compensated
by additional revenues. Berger et al. (1997) further research the trade o￿ between
increasing e￿ciency and loosing revenues which goes along with the consolidations
of branch networks. Obviously, the size of a branch plays an important factor in this
trade o￿.
17the city or county. As expected less branches are given up in the immediate
year of merger activities - management capacity in these years is probably
bound on integration tasks. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that
merger agreements often contain explicit agreements that the branch network
is kept unchanged for the coming years.
In column (3) we add further controls for the economic characteristics of the
city our county. In economically weak areas, savings banks tend to close less
branches. This is worth mentioning as one might expect exactly the opposite
behavior as branches in weak areas are of less value to attract good customers.
This might be a clear sign of the "public duty" of savings banks to support
their city or county. Rural areas are more a￿ected by closures, which might
re￿ect the ongoing trend of young and educated people migrating to the cities.
This result is con￿rmed when the proxy for rural areas is substituted by the
population density in column (5).
Change in the number of employees
Next we try to understand how the probability of redundancies or new hires,
i.e. changes in the number of employees, is a￿ected. Again, we run a probit
model where the dependent variable indicates a positive or negative change
in the number of employees of more than one percent from one year to an-
other. 25 Columns (1) and (4) in table 5 show the core relationships for a
reduction and an increase in employees, respectively. As expected the sign
for a reduction is negative whereas the sign for an increase is positive. Both
coe￿cients are highly signi￿cant di￿erent from zero. Looking at probabilities,
elections decrease the probability of employee reductions by 17% and increase
the likelihood of new hires by nearly 25% for an average savings bank, ceteris
paribus. Both values indicate the economic signi￿cance of the ￿ndings.
In column (2) and (5) we add controls for bank speci￿cs and the macroeco-
nomic environment. Sign and magnitude of the coe￿cient for our variable of
interest - election - do not change. Bank size matters only in the case of em-
ployee increases. Interestingly, the negative sign indicates that smaller banks
are more likely to hire new employees than their bigger peers. Coe￿cients for
operating e￿ciency Operating expenses/total assets and pro￿tability measured
as return on assets are in line with our previous ￿ndings for branch closures:
the more cost e￿cient and the more pro￿table a bank is the lower the need to
reduce the number of people and the higher the possibility even to hire new
employees. This is a very important ￿nding as it suggests that pro￿tability as
well as e￿ciency and social objectives (as caring for employees) rather facili-
tate than hinder each other - a point often neglected in the political discussion.
The coe￿cient for loan loss reserves re￿ects this ￿nding as well: the stronger
25 We set a minimum threshold of 1% to exclude natural ￿uctuations. Other thresh-
olds, e.g. 5% do not change the results.
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The impact of election years, market structure and other bank characteristics on the
probability of branch closures
Probit estimation with bank and time speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating
a reduction in the number of branches year-to-year. Election is a dummy indicating an election year.
If the election is held in the second half of the year the same calendar year is de￿ned as election
year. If the election is held in the ￿rst half of the year the previous year is de￿ned as election year.
Total assets is the logarithm of total assets (in EUR mn). Growth total assets is the year-on-year
growth of total assets in percent. Operating expenses/total assets , Loan loss reserves/total assets,
Return on assets all denoted in percent. Return on assets is pro￿t before taxes over total assets. Total
assets/branch in EUR millions. Employees/branch is the number of employees divided by number of
branches. Market concentration is the Hirschmann-Her￿ndahl-Index based on number of branches in
the economic region ("ROR"). Merger activity is a dummy indicating a merger in year t. Weak area is
a dummy indicating that the city/county belongs to the lowest quartile in terms of GDP per capita.
Rural area indicates that the city/county belongs to the lowest quartile with regard to population
density. Population density is the number of inhabitants per square kilometer in thousands. GDP
growth is the year-to-year growth of GDP denoted in percent. Prob(EP=0) is the probability of
an average bank to be involved in a merger if there is no election year; Prob(EP=1) indicates the
probability in case of an election year.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Election -0.1257** -0.1188** -0.1224** -0.1227** -0.1020*
Total assets 0.4442*** 0.4505*** 0.4487*** 0.5536***
Growth total assets -0.0125** -0.0117* -0.0119* -0.0096
Operating expenses / total assets 0.1422 0.1821* 0.2106** 0.3098***
Loan loss reserves / total assets 0.0102 0.0181 0.0191 0.0216
Return on assets -0.3789*** -0.3730*** -0.3728*** -0.3638***
Total assets / branch 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Employees / branch -0.0045
Market concentration (HHI) 0.7715** 0.7813* 0.7997* 0.5333
Merger activity -0.2827*** -0.2768*** -0.2764*** -0.3416***
Weak area -0.0940* -0.0940* -0.1181**
GDP growth 0.0080 0.0081 0.0098
Population density -0.2997***
Rural area 0.1257** 0.1268**
Constant -0.4771*** -2.5463*** -3.2320*** -3.2700*** -3.8560***
Observations 5,484 5,466 5,464 5,464 5,408
Number of bank 457 457 457 457 457
Chi2 220.28 496.73 504.64 504.93 537.09
p(Chi2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo-R2 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09
Prob(EP=0) 0.3260 0.3251 0.3251 0.3252 0.3229
Prob(EP=1) 0.2676 0.2680 0.2677 0.2678 0.2669
Notes: Robust standard errors and time-speci￿c e￿ects not reported. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signif-
icant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
the loan portfolio of a bank, the smaller the pressure on employees. To con-
trol for the operating e￿ciency of the branch and the employees we include
total assets/branch and accounts/employee (columns (3) and (6)). Whereas
the former is not signi￿cant the latter shows a positive and highly signi￿-
cant sign with regard to employee reductions and a negative sign with regard
19to employee increases. It seems as if banks with high employee productivity
according to this measure are more likely to further reduce employees if nec-
essary. The role of market concentration is noteworthy: the higher the market
concentration the higher the probability of layo￿s and the lower the likelihood
of new hires. The interpretation remains ambigous without further analysis.
Merger activities and all additional variables concerning the local economic
situation are not signi￿cant. Again, although not signi￿cant, savings banks in
weak areas tend to lay o￿ less people.
20Table 5
The impact of election years, market structure and other bank characteristics on the probability of changes in the number of employees
Probit estimation with bank and time speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects. Dependent variables: Employee reduction and Employee increase are two dummies
indicating a reduction or increase in the number of employees year-to-year by more than one percent. Election is a dummy indicating an election.
If the election is held in the second half of the year the same calendar year is de￿ned as election year. If the election is held in the ￿rst half of the
year the previous year is de￿ned as election year. Total assets is the logarithm of total assets (in EUR mn). Growth total assets is the year-on-year
growth of total assets in percent. Operating expenses/total assets , Loan loss reserves/total assets, Return on assets all denoted in percent. Return
on assets is pro￿t before taxes over total assets. Total assets/branch in EUR millions. Accounts/employees is the number of accounts divided by
the number of employees (FTE). Market concentration is the Hirschmann-Her￿ndahl-Index based on number of branches in the economic region
("ROR"). Merger activity is a dummy indicating a merger in year t. Weak area is a dummy indicating that the city/county belongs to the lowest
quartile in terms of GDP per capita. Rural area indicates that the city/county belongs to the lowest quartile with regard to population density.
Population density is the number of inhabitants per square kilometer in thousands. GDP growth is the year-to-year growth of GDP denoted in
percent. Prob(EP=0) is the probability of an average bank to be involved in a merger if there is no election year; Prob(EP=1) indicates the
probability in case of an election year.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election -0.1521*** -0.1616*** -0.1755*** 0.1426*** 0.1469*** 0.1295***
Total assets 0.0085 0.0155 -0.1916*** -0.1964***
Growth total assets -0.0491*** -0.0507*** 0.0473*** 0.0467***
Operating expenses / total assets 0.1743 0.1463 -0.3627*** -0.4187***
Loan loss reserves / total assets 0.0788*** 0.0408** -0.0496*** -0.0247
Return on assets -0.3595*** -0.4761*** 0.0930 0.1412*
Total assets / branch 0.0000 0.0000
Accounts / employees 0.0019*** -0.0012***
Market concentration (HHI) 1.1157*** 1.1778*** -0.4370 -0.6897
Merger activity 0.1290 0.0300 0.0733 0.1312
Weak area 0.0141 -0.0216 -0.0735 -0.0582
GDP growth 0.0052 0.0058 0.0007 -0.0012
Rural area -0.0064 0.0229 -0.0291 -0.0407
Constant -0.7546*** 3.7089*** 3.7825*** -0.2151*** -2.9030*** -2.8843***
Observations 5,484 5,476 4,905 5,484 5,476 4,905
Number of bank 457 457 457 457 457 457
Chi2 615.25 735.06 645.71 440.22 578.93 492.79
p(Chi2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo-R2 0.09 0.12 0.20 0.07 0.10 0.22
Prob(EP=0) 0.4246 0.4362 0.4478 0.2328 0.2245 0.2165
Prob(EP=1) 0.3523 0.3750 0.4180 0.2887 0.2690 0.2282
Notes: Robust standard errors and time-speci￿c e￿ects not reported. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
2
1Merger activities
The dependent variable in this analysis is a dummy indicating whether the
particular bank is involved in a merger in the observed year, either as a tar-
get or an acquirer. Column (1) and (2) in table 6 show the results for the
whole sample. The insigni￿cant coe￿cients for our explanatory variable elec-
tion suggest that an election does not e￿ect the timing of merger activities.
From interviews with representatives of the German Savings Bank Associa-
tion ("DSGV") we know, however, that a lot of mergers in Eastern Germany
are due to adjustments of the demarcation of the counties and cities. 26 These
changes in demarcation are very common during the nineties in Eastern Ger-
many as a consequence of the reuni￿cation but are very rare in Western Ger-
many. Thus, we reran the analysis with a subsample of savings banks from
West Germany only. For this subsample, the coe￿cient of election is negative
and signi￿cant as expected (columns (3) and (4)). Obviously, the signi￿cant
number of "forced" mergers in Eastern Germany distorts the picture. In a
third analysis we further eliminate these observations where the pro￿tability
(return on assets) of the bank in the particular year was among the lowest
quintile as these banks might be in ￿nancial distress and, thus, be forced into
a merger to avoid bankruptcy. In these cases politicians have only limited pos-
sibilities to avoid mergers. Column (5) and (6) show that the probability of
a merger around an election for the banks in the remaining sample is even
lower.
The coe￿cients for operating expenses over total assets and pro￿tability con-
￿rm ￿ndings by other authors on the determinants of mergers, e.g. Koetter
et al. (2007) or Elsas (2004): especially ine￿cient and less pro￿table banks
engage in mergers, most likely as the target that is bought by the stronger
neighbouring bank. 27 Macroeconomic characteristics do not seem to play a
major role with the exception that savings banks in rural areas seem to be
much more likely to be involved in mergers. One reason could again be a tim-
ing issue: potentially the bigger banks in the urban centers started the merger
wave and now we see the more rural banks following.
26 E.g. if two counties merge the two associated savings banks have to merge as well.
27 Note, however, that we cannot di￿erentiate between target and buyer in our data.
Very often this is also not fully transparent to the public as most mergers are o￿cially
executed as mergers among equal banks.
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The impact of election years, market structure and other bank characteristics on the probability of merger activities
Probit estimation with bank and time speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating that the particular
bank was involved in a merger in year t. Election is a dummy indicating an election. If the election is held in the second
half of the year the same calendar year is de￿ned as election year. If the election is held in the ￿rst half of the year the
previous year is de￿ned as election year. Total assets is the logarithm of total assets (in EUR mn). Growth total assets is
the year-on-year growth of total assets in percent. Operating expenses/total assets , Loan loss reserves/total assets, Return
on assets, Equity ratio all denoted in percent. Return on assets is pro￿t before taxes over total assets. Equity ratio is total
equity divided by total assets. Market concentration is the Hirschmann-Her￿ndahl-Index based on number of branches in
the economic region ("ROR"). Weak area is a dummy indicating that the city/county belongs to the lowest quartile in
terms of GDP per capita. Rural area indicates that the city/county belongs to the lowest quartile with regard to population
density. Population density is the number of inhabitants per square kilometer in thousands. GDP growth is the year-to-year
growth of GDP denoted in percent. Prob(EP=0) is the probability of an average bank to be involved in a merger if there
is no election year; Prob(EP=1) indicates the probability in case of an election year.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election -0.0773 -0.0656 -0.2873** -0.2689** -0.2849** -0.2668**
Total assets 0.5123*** 0.5186*** 0.5345***
Growth total assets 0.0051 0.0051 0.0087
Operating expenses / total assets 0.5421*** 0.6742*** 0.6841***
Loan loss reserves / total assets -0.0543 -0.0522 -0.0925**
Return on assets -0.8665*** -0.6885*** -0.6973***
Equity ratio 0.0162 0.0858 0.0586
Market concentration (HHI) 1.0127 -0.2366 -0.1696
Weak area 0.0794 -0.0064 0.0211
GDP growth 0.0272** 0.0107 0.0094
Rural area 0.1258 0.2409** 0.1898*
Constant -1.9368*** -6.6227*** -2.0647*** -8.2610*** -1.9024*** -8.1672***
Observations 5,941 5,476 4,953 4,567 4,465 4,166
Number of bank 457 457 381 381 379 379
Chi2 57.60 180.96 50.06 125.11 48.00 138.02
p(Chi2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo-R2 0.04 0.28 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.24
Prob(EP=0) 0.0232 0.0146 0.0189 0.0132 0.0197 0.0126
Prob(EP=1) 0.0228 0.0154 0.0079 0.0048 0.0088 0.0050
Notes: Robust standard errors and time-speci￿c e￿ects not reported. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant
at 1%
2
3Extraordinary expenses
The whole savings banks sector in Germany 28 spends a signi￿cant amount of
money each year in sponsoring societal activities, like sponsoring local sport
teams, funding exhibitions or giving money to charity groups. As pointed out
in section 3 these benevolent activities are an integral part of the corporate
mission of savings banks, which is laid down in the savings bank laws of
the states. As these payments are a very easy and direct way to support
local interest groups, it is of special interest to see whether this channel is
used in a political context. Since the expenses for these activities are not
published separately in the pro￿t and loss accounts we analyse the change in
extraordinary expenses, which include these spendings, with regard to election
years. 29 For this analysis we run a ￿xed-e￿ect regression with extraordinary
expenses scaled by total assets as dependent variable.
Again we start looking at the core relationship in column (1) of table 7 and ￿nd
a highly signi￿cant positive relationship. In other words, savings banks tend
to spend a higher amount on extraordinary activities in election years than in
other years: on average they spend 0.03 percentage points more with regard
to their total assets. This amounts to approximately 560 thousand Euros on
average of extra spendings during election years. Comparing this amount to
an average net pro￿t of EUR 4.5 millions highlights the economic signi￿cance.
As we add further controls in column (2), the coe￿cient of interest does not
change in direction or magnitude. Taking a closer look at our control variables
we ￿nd that larger banks spend relatively more as well as more pro￿table banks
do. Interesting is the fact that operating expenses and the size of the loan
loss reserves are positively related with extraordinary expenses. Potentially,
that ￿nding re￿ects the diverging attitude of bank managers with regard to
their dual objective of pro￿tability and social responsibility. Managers of some
savings banks might put in general less emphasis on pro￿tability and focus
instead slightly more on the social objectives. As a direct result they might
grant more risky loans, employ some more people than required from a pure
economical point of view, and spend more on supporting local social activities.
Weaker banks with a lower equity ratio spend slightly less, which is as expected
as retained earnings is the only way for savings banks to built equity. Thus,
savings banks with a low equity ratio might be forced to retain more of their
earnings to strenghten their capital base. With regard to the market struc-
ture, banks in more concentrated markets seem to spend also less. As social
28 This also includes the state-owned "Landesbanken" as well as other associated
￿nancial institutions like the mutual fund management company "DEKA".
29 We are aware that the category extraordinary expenses includes a number of other
expense categories. However, none of the other categories is of plausible political
interest, such as losses incurred from discarding property.
24spendings are also a marketing tool to some extent, this behavior is expected.
If there are more competing banks in an area sponsoring di￿erent local events,
savings banks have to spend more money to achieve the same public visibility.
Higher spendings in a year of a merger could re￿ect two e￿ects. First, banks
might spend more to actively demonstrate their strong commitment to the
local area. Second, that might to a certain extend be the statistical result of
a contracting balance sheet as it is common in the aftermath of bank merg-
ers. However, further analysis reveals that the absolute amount of spending
signi￿cantly increases in the year of a merger supporting the former explana-
tion. Noteworthy is also that spending seems to be signi￿cantly less in weak
areas. At ￿rst glance that is contra-intuitive to the objective of savings banks
to support the local communities or cities. However, it might merely re￿ect
fewer opportunities for the bank to engage in sponsoring because there might
be less social activities and institutions in place in economically weak areas.
The coe￿cients of the other macroeconomic controls are not signi￿cant.
To make sure that the results are not driven by just a few banks with abnormal
high extraordinary expenses, we exclude the top 5% of the banks with the
highest spendings in relation to their size and ￿nd results unchanged.
Loan growth
In the vain of Dinc (2005) our last channel of political in￿uence deals with
additional loans granted around elections. Dinc (2005) ￿nds additional loan
growth during election years only in transition economies. 30 Based on our
more detailed loan data and the complete information on all 457 savings banks
we aim to show a similar in￿uence also for a developed market like Germany.
To do so we run a ￿xed e￿ect regression with year-to-year loan growth as a
dependent variable. We look not only at the total loan volume to non-banks
but also distinguish between corporate and private loans.
Column (1) and (2) in table 8 contain the results for the impact of elections
on the percentage change of the total loan volume. Con￿rming the results of
Dinc (2005), the sign of the coe￿cient is positive and highly signi￿cant. Ceteris
paribus, loan growth is approximately 42 basis points higher in election periods
compared to other years. With regard to the average annual loan growth rate
of some 240 basis points during the observation period the result is also of
great economic interest.
To understand whether these e￿ects are driven by corporate or private loans,
we rerun the regressions with respective subsamples and report the results in
columns (3) to (6). 31 We ￿nd the same positive and highly signi￿cant coe￿-
30 One reason might be that he also only looks into the 10 biggest banks per country,
i.e. neglecting state-owned savings banks in Germany alltogether.
31 Note that the analysis for corporate loans excludes mortgage loans.
25Table 7
The impact of election years, market structure and other bank characteristics on
extraordinary expenses of savings banks
Fixed e￿ect panel regression with bank and time speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects. Dependent
variable is extraordinary expenses scaled by total assets. Election is a dummy in-
dicating an election. If the election is held in the second half of the year the same
calendar year is de￿ned as election year. If the election is held in the ￿rst half of the
year the previous year is de￿ned as election year. Total assets is the logarithm of total
assets (in EUR mn). Growth total assets is the year-on-year growth of total assets in
percent. Operating expenses/total assets , Loan loss reserves/total assets, Return on
assets, Equity ratio all denoted in percent. Return on assets is pro￿t before taxes over
total assets. Equity ratio is total equity divided by total assets. Market concentration
is the Hirschmann-Her￿ndahl-Index based on number of branches in the economic
region ("ROR"). Merger activity is a dummy indicating a merger in year t. Weak
area is a dummy indicating that the city/county belongs to the lowest quartile in
terms of GDP per capita. Rural area indicates that the city/county belongs to the
lowest quartile with regard to population density. Population density is the number
of inhabitants per square kilometer in thousands. GDP growth is the year-to-year
growth of GDP denoted in percent. Prob(EP=0) is the probability of an average
bank to be involved in a merger if there is no election year; Prob(EP=1) indicates
the probability in case of an election year.
(1) (2)
Election 0.0286*** 0.0294***
Total assets 0.0124***
Growth total assets -0.0009
Operating expenses / total assets 0.0490***
Loan loss reserves / total assets 0.0076***
Return on assets 0.2222***
Equity ratio -0.0049*
Market concentration (HHI) -0.1661***
Merger activity 0.0682***
Weak area -0.0068
GDP growth -0.0001
Rural area 0.0035
Constant 0.1993*** -0.0059
Observations 5,936 5,472
Number of bank 457 457
R2 0.25 0.42
Notes: Robust standard errors and time-speci￿c e￿ects not reported. * signi￿cant at
10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
cients suggesting that the ￿ndings are not driven by one particular segment.
The magnitude of the change in growth is even higher for the two segments
with growth rates increasing by approximately 110 basis points and 79bp re-
spectively.
There is a highly signi￿cant negative relationship between loan growth and
the riskiness of the loan portfolio. This result con￿rms recent ￿ndings by Foos
et al. (2007), who analyse the impact of loan growth on the riskiness of banks.
Potentially contrary to the ￿ndings of Foos et al. (2007), who show that loan
26growth goes along with relatively lower interest rates our results suggest a
positive relation between total loan growth and average interest rates. The
negative relation with the equity ratio again con￿rms similar ￿ndings by Foos
et al. (2007). 32 This is expected as savings banks cannot obtain outside equity,
thus, the equity ratio has to drop if total assets rise due to loan growth.
Market concentration has only a partially negative impact on total loan growth.
This is in line with research by Rhoades and Rutz (1982), who analyse the
so-called "Quiet Life Hypothesis", i.e. the notion that banks in less compet-
itive markets operate less e￿cient, on a sample of US banks. They ￿nd that
banks in highly concentrated markets tend to take less credit risk into their
portfolios.
In the long-run, loan growth should be positively related with GDP growth
and negatively with interest rate levels as Calza et al. (2003) show for the
Euro area. Thus, the strongly positive correlation between general interest
rate levels and loan growth might merely re￿ect the continuous trend over
the observation period of declining interest rates and loan growth rates. There
is probably no direct causal link between these two variables as anecdotal
evidence suggests that savings banks were willing to lend more during recent
years but were unable to ￿nd suitable investment opportunities. 33 The lack
of suitable investment opportunities might also be the explanation behind the
lower growth rate in rural areas.
32 Dinc (2005) also uses the equity ratio in his analysis but ￿nds opposite results.
In developing countries banks with higher equity ratios seem to grow their loan
portfolio more.
33 Due to earnings on record levels an increasing number of corporates was able to
￿nance investment projects with internal funds.
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The impact of election years, market structure and other bank characteristics on growth of loan volumes
Fixed e￿ect panel regression with bank and time speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects. Dependent variables are year-to-year growth of total
loan volume to non-banks, corporate loan volume excl. mortgages, private loan volume. Election is a dummy indicating an
election. If the election is held in the second half of the year the same calendar year is de￿ned as election year. If the election
is held in the ￿rst half of the year the previous year is de￿ned as election year. Total assets is the logarithm of total assets
(in EUR mn). Operating expenses/total assets , Loan loss reserves/total assets, Return on assets, Equity ratio all denoted in
percent. Return on assets is pro￿t before taxes over total assets. Equity ratio is total equity divided by total assets. Market
concentration is the Hirschmann-Her￿ndahl-Index based on number of branches in the economic region ("ROR"). Merger
activity is a dummy indicating a merger in year t. Interest rate is the average 1y-EURIBOR for year t. Weak area is a dummy
indicating that the city/county belongs to the lowest quartile in terms of GDP per capita. Rural area indicates that the
city/county belongs to the lowest quartile with regard to population density. Population density is the number of inhabitants
per square kilometer in thousands. GDP growth is the year-to-year growth of GDP denoted in percent. Prob(EP=0) is the
probability of an average bank to be involved in a merger if there is no election year; Prob(EP=1) indicates the probability
in case of an election year.
Total loans Corporate loans Private loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election period 0.4212** 0.4115** 1.0963*** 1.1170*** 0.7915** 0.7902**
Total assets -0.1071 -0.1334 -0.2264 -0.2656 0.0892 0.0551
Operating expenses / total assets -0.3066 -0.6379 -1.7111*** -1.6547*** 0.2989 0.0165
Loan loss reserves / total assets -0.4374*** -0.4024*** -0.5971*** -0.4261*** -0.1415 -0.0325
Return on assets 3.0183*** 2.7339*** 4.8533*** 4.5198*** 2.1922*** 1.7547***
Equity ratio -0.5339*** -0.5067*** -0.6654***
Deposit-to-loan ratio 0.0029 -0.0116*** -0.0019
Market concentration (HHI) -3.9557* -3.5799 -13.2948*** -7.8233*** -4.4645 -2.1291
Merger activity -0.0112 -0.0454 0.4544 0.3913 -0.6198 -0.6869
Interest rate 1.0059*** 1.1164*** 1.6117*** 1.7319*** 1.4005*** 1.5549***
Weak region 0.5090*** 0.5923*** 0.1910 0.4666 0.6119* 0.8068**
GDP growth 0.0074 0.0079 -0.0349 -0.0095 -0.0376 -0.0274
Rural region -0.4900** -0.5609** -0.6379** -0.6991** -0.6121** -0.6919**
Constant 3.1119** 0.7354 6.9445*** 4.2591* -0.0252 -3.2121
Observations 4,548 4,543 4,548 4,543 4,548 4,543
Number of bank 457 457 457 457 457 457
R2 0.24 0.25 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11
Notes: Robust standard errors and time-speci￿c e￿ects not reported. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant
at 1%
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87 Further Analyses
In this section we conduct further analyses to shed more light on the circum-
stances that foster political in￿uence on savings banks. We pick one example
from each of the three main categories: bank speci￿cs, economic situation
of the particular city or county, and political environment. Speci￿cally, we
analyse the impact of bank pro￿tability, economical strength of the area, and
political power of the respective local parties.
Bank speci￿cs
Despite their public duty to support the local development and societal ac-
tivities savings banks are expected to be pro￿table. The German Savings
Bank Association states "savings banks are expected to operate pro￿t ori-
ented, though not pro￿t maximizing." That suggests that savings banks that
are more pro￿table have more leeway to spend money on social activities or
allow for certain ine￿ciencies like too many branches or a larger work force.
Furthermore, savings banks need to retain some earnings as this is their only
source to build equity, which they need for potential further growth. In short,
savings banks need to achieve a certain - not clearly de￿ned - pro￿t level. Once
they reached this level, they are relatively free in how to spend potential ad-
ditional pro￿ts. Thus, political in￿uence can be expected to be stronger if the
savings bank is more pro￿table. This is even more true as the same politicians
are very often also responsible for the overall results of the savings banks in
their role as member (or even head) of the supervisory board. If the pro￿tabil-
ity is below general expectations they might be more hesitant to put further
strains on the bank. An according result would also be a strong indication
of the suggested causality as the reverse causality should result in a negative
relationship between political in￿uence and pro￿tability, i.e. the higher the
political in￿uence the lower the pro￿tability. To test for this hypothesis we
de￿ne two new subsamples: high prof and low prof. High prof indicates the
highly pro￿table savings banks whose return on assets (excluding extraordi-
nary expenses) is in the top quartile. In the same way low prof refers to the
banks in the lowest quartile of pro￿tability.
Table 9 depicts the results with regard to branch closures, employee reductions,
extraordinary expenses and growth of total loan volume. As columns (3) to
(8) show, our hypothesis is con￿rmed for three out of four analyzed activities:
employee redundancies, extraordinary expenses and total loan growth. In all
of these cases, the coe￿cient of election is more signi￿cant or stronger in mag-
nitude for the subsample of high pro￿table banks versus the subsample of low
pro￿table banks. That is, as expected political in￿uence seems to be stronger
if the associated savings bank is more pro￿table. Only in the case of branch
closures (columns (1) and (2)) we observe the opposite e￿ect. One explanation
29might be that the strong and successful management of a pro￿table savings
bank is willing to support their local politicians with minor adjustments as de-
fering employee reductions or spending more on extraordinary activities but
is not willing to accept political in￿uence on major strategic decisions like
branch closures.
For all four pairs of regressions the coe￿cients of the controls show the same
direction as in the respective primary analyses.
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The impact of bank pro￿tability on the degree of political in￿uence
Probit model for regression on Branch closure, Employee reduction and ￿xed e￿ect panel regression for Extraordinary expenses and Growth total loans. All models with
bank and time speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects. Dependent variables as de￿ned in previous regressions. Election is a dummy indicating an election. If the election is held in the
second half of the year the same calendar year is de￿ned as election year. If the election is held in the ￿rst half of the year the previous year is de￿ned as election year.
Total assets is the logarithm of total assets (in EUR mn). Growth total assets is the year-on-year growth of total assets in percent. Operating expenses/total assets , Loan
loss reserves/total assets, Return on assets, Equity ratio all denoted in percent. Return on assets is pro￿t before taxes over total assets. Equity ratio is total equity
divided by total assets. Total assets/branch in EUR millions. Total assets/employee is total assets divided by number of employees (FTE). Market concentration is the
Hirschmann-Her￿ndahl-Index based on number of branches in the economic region ("ROR"). Merger activity is a dummy indicating a merger in year t. Interest rate is the
average 1y-EURIBOR for year t. Weak area is a dummy indicating that the city/county belongs to the lowest quartile in terms of GDP per capita. Rural area indicates
that the city/county belongs to the lowest quartile with regard to population density. Population density is the number of inhabitants per square kilometer in thousands.
GDP growth is the year-to-year growth of GDP denoted in percent. The two subsamples High prof. and Low prof. consist of the banks belonging to the highest and lowest
quartile with regard to return on assets before taxes and extraordinary expenses. The R2 for all probit regressions is a pseudo-R2 based on the likelihood estimators.
Branch closure Employee reduction Extraordinary expenses Growth total loans
High prof. Low prof. High prof. Low prof. High prof. Low prof. High prof. Low prof.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Election period 0.0291 -0.3355** -0.2097** -0.0547 0.0359*** 0.0259** 0.8036* 0.1433
Total assets 0.4625*** 0.2763** 0.1427 -0.1268 0.0067 -0.0007 0.4452 -1.1072
Growth total assets -0.0003 -0.0374** -0.0331*** -0.0784*** -0.0005 -0.0006
Operating expenses / total assets -0.0049 0.5337** 0.5338* 0.3659 0.0605*** 0.0167 0.6781 -1.5865*
Loan loss reserves / total assets 0.0083 -0.0026 0.1289*** -0.0065 0.0064* 0.0078* -0.5690*** -0.6503***
Return on assets -0.4238** -0.6610*** -0.4611*** -0.0573 0.2144*** 0.2412*** 3.6962*** 2.2837***
Equity ratio -0.0020 0.0004 -0.3535 -0.2963
Total assets / branch 0.0000 0.0000
Total assets / employee 0.0000 0.0003***
Market concentration (HHI) 0.6538 1.5719* 0.8407 2.0979*** -0.2873*** -0.0195 -3.5743 12.6712*
Merger activity -0.4904*** 0.3618 0.0606 0.9367* 0.0582*** 0.1173*** -0.3050 -3.1470
Weak region 0.0825 -0.1224 -0.0464 -0.0112 0.0009 0.0129 -0.3895 0.1468
GDP growth 0.0072 0.0000 0.0071 0.0051 -0.0008 -0.0018 0.0009 0.0786
Rural region 0.1679 0.0711 -0.1040 -0.0719 0.0589*** -0.0182 -0.1442 -1.8678**
Interest rates 1.2677*** 1.0546***
Constant -3.6183** 0.1339 0.2724 6.2469*** -0.0239 0.0688 -4.8278 9.6479*
Observations 1,405 1,317 1,410 1,324 1,410 1,322 1,228 1,035
Number of bank 138 148 138 148 138 148 138 127
Chi2 102.43 80.05 210.63 148.47
p(Chi2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.49 0.42 0.23 0.29
Notes: Robust standard errors and time-speci￿c e￿ects not reported. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
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1Economic situation
Another external factor that might determine the strength of political in￿u-
ence is the local economic situation. It is plausible to assume that a certain
level of support by the local savings bank is more visible in the public eye,
and as such more fruitful for the respective politician if the economic situation
is weak. In a strong economic environment people should depend less on the
local savings bank as an employer, social sponsor or loan provider as in a weak
environment. To further analyse the importance of the economic situation we
de￿ne three subsamples refering to the tercile with regard to GDP per capita
of the city or county: weak, medium and strong.
Table 10 shows the results for the ￿xed e￿ect regressions for the subsamples
with regard to change in employees, extraordinary expenses and total loan
growth. Surprisingly, we ￿nd for all three analyses outcomes contrary to our
expectations: it seems that political in￿uence is the lowest for areas which
are economically weak. The coe￿cient of election is always lowest in the weak
scenario or even insigni￿cant except for branch closure (column (1)). Looking
at the likelihood of employee reductions and the growth of total loans, it even
seems that political in￿uence is highest for areas of medium economic strength.
One can only speculate why savings banks in economically weak areas are less
prone to political in￿uence. Probably the overall banking business is weaker in
these areas leaving less room for savings banks to support the political agenda
of their government-owner.
32Table 10
The impact of the strength of the local economy on the degree of political in￿uence
Probit model for regression on Branch closure and Employee reduction; ￿xed e￿ect panel regression for Extraordinary expenses and Growth total loans. All models with bank and time
speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects. Dependent variables as de￿ned in previous regressions. Election is a dummy indicating an election. If the election is held in the second half of the year the same
calendar year is de￿ned as election year. If the election is held in the ￿rst half of the year the previous year is de￿ned as election year. Total assets is the logarithm of total assets (in EUR
mn). Growth total assets is the year-on-year growth of total assets in percent. Operating expenses/total assets , Loan loss reserves/total assets, Return on assets, Equity ratio all denoted
in percent. Return on assets is pro￿t before taxes over total assets. Equity ratio is total equity divided by total assets. Total assets/branch in EUR millions. Total assets/employee is
total assets divided by number of employees (FTE). Market concentration is the Hirschmann-Her￿ndahl-Index based on number of branches in the economic region ("ROR"). Merger
activity is a dummy indicating a merger in year t. Interest rate is the average 1y-EURIBOR for year t. Weak area is a dummy indicating that the city/county belongs to the lowest
quartile in terms of GDP per capita. Rural area indicates that the city/county belongs to the lowest quartile with regard to population density. Population density is the number of
inhabitants per square kilometer in thousands. GDP growth is the year-to-year growth of GDP denoted in percent. The three subsamples Weak, Medium, Strong consist of the banks in
cities/counties in the lowest, medium, highest tercile with regard to GDP per capita. The R2 for all probit regressions is a pseudo-R2 based on the likelihood estimators.
Branch closure Employee reduction Extraordinary expenses Growth total loans
Weak Medium Strong Weak Medium Strong Weak Medium Strong Weak Medium Strong
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Election period -0.1688* -0.1573 -0.0807 -0.0093 -0.2796*** -0.1897*** 0.0142* 0.0365*** 0.0389*** 0.1398 0.7207** 0.3998
Total assets 0.4685*** 0.5309*** 0.4178*** -0.0293 0.0104 0.0331 0.0140** 0.0060 0.0167*** 0.0606 -0.2328 0.0764
Growth total assets -0.0014 -0.0278** -0.0118 -0.0626*** -0.0438*** -0.0401*** -0.0005 -0.0036*** -0.0003
Operating expenses / total assets 0.2572 0.3443* -0.0317 0.1742 0.0760 0.3947 0.0477*** 0.0569*** 0.0508*** 1.8582*** -0.6363 -1.5128***
Loan loss reserves / total assets -0.0005 0.0064 0.0328 0.0944*** 0.0877*** 0.0620** 0.0055* 0.0027 0.0113*** -0.5489*** -0.3121*** -0.3992***
Return on assets -0.2125* -0.5539*** -0.3932*** -0.2519** -0.5815*** -0.3177** 0.2078*** 0.2175*** 0.2515*** 2.5622*** 3.7815*** 2.9781***
Equity ratio -0.0098** -0.0108** -0.0031 -0.7726*** -0.7034*** -0.0305
Total assets / branch 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Market concentration (HHI) 1.0164* 0.6647 1.2543 2.1810*** -0.0417 0.6015 -0.2081*** -0.0675 -0.2420** -4.8407* -7.9597** -0.5192
Merger activity 0.1630 -0.5040** -0.4648*** 0.2247 0.0731 0.1600 0.0725*** 0.0834*** 0.0495*** -0.1035 0.4618 -0.3681
GDP growth 0.0074 -0.0037 0.0180* -0.0017 0.0144 0.0036 0.0002 -0.0021* 0.0001 0.0365 -0.0336 -0.0128
Rural region 0.0344 0.0827 0.3161** 0.0824 -0.0800 -0.0813 -0.0028 0.0036 0.0342** -0.2946 -0.7147** -0.7172**
Interest rates 0.6506** 1.0825*** 1.2931***
Constant -4.7158*** -5.0576*** -4.0366*** -1.9154** 0.0435 -1.6969** -0.1668** -0.1683** -0.3207*** 1.1439 5.4593** -0.3957
Observations 1,853 1,801 1,810 1,857 1,809 1,810 1,853 1,809 1,810 1,545 1,504 1,499
Number of bank 200 208 179 200 208 179 200 208 179 198 196 173
Chi2 162.66 201.51 191.6 272.41 275.21 216.9
p(Chi2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.39 0.41 0.52 0.26 0.28 0.23
Notes: Robust standard errors and time-speci￿c e￿ects not reported. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
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3Political environment
Work by Sapienza (2004) indicates that the political strength of the party or
person that controls the bank might in￿uence the magnitude of the in￿uence.
That is, the older and stronger the ties between politics and bank the stronger
the political in￿uence. In her anaylsis on the Italian banking market Sapienza
(2004) ￿nds that the stronger the political majorities the lower the charged
interest rate, i.e. the higher the political in￿uence. In the following we investi-
gate whether we can con￿rm these ￿ndings for the case of the German savings
banks. To do so, we de￿ne two new subsamples: weak majority and strong ma-
jority. A majority is weak if the number of votes in the current election for the
two main parties CDU and SPD di￿ers by less than 15%. It is strong if one
of these parties achieved an absolute majority, i.e. obtained more than 50% of
the votes. To check for robustness of the results we also applied a margin of
10% di￿erences in votes to de￿ne a weak majority and ￿nd results unchanged.
Table 11 contrasts the results for the two subsamples based on weak and strong
political majorities with regard to branch closures, employee reductions, ex-
traordinary expenses and growth of total loans. For the e￿ect on employee
reductions and extraordinary expenses, we ￿nd the expected impact of an
election only to be signi￿cant for regions with weak political majorities. This
￿nding is somewhat contrary to Sapienza (2004). However, it seems highly
plausible as it indicates that politicians use their in￿uence on savings banks
when their election/reelection is jeopardized. If majorities are clear and politi-
cians do not need to worry about their election, they do not need to make
use of their in￿uential power. This ￿nding is in line with observations by
Cole (2007) for the Indian market and Bertrand et al. (2004) for politically
connected corporates in France.
There are no signi￿cant e￿ects for branch closures or growth total loans, which
might re￿ect the fact that both of these actions require longer planing and
cannot be in￿uenced any more on a short-term base when elections turn out
to become tight.
For all four pairs of regressions the coe￿cients of the controls show the same
direction as in the respective primary analyses.
34Table 11
The impact of local political majorities on the degree of political in￿uence
Probit model for regression on Branch closure and Employee reduction; ￿xed e￿ect panel regression for Extraordinary expenses and Growth total loans. All models with bank and time
speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects. Dependent variables as de￿ned in previous regressions. Election is a dummy indicating an election. If the election is held in the second half of the year the same
calendar year is de￿ned as election year. If the election is held in the ￿rst half of the year the previous year is de￿ned as election year. Total assets is the logarithm of total assets (in EUR
mn). Growth total assets is the year-on-year growth of total assets in percent. Operating expenses/total assets , Loan loss reserves/total assets, Return on assets, Equity ratio all denoted
in percent. Return on assets is pro￿t before taxes over total assets. Equity ratio is total equity divided by total assets. Total assets/branch in EUR millions. Total assets/employee is total
assets divided by number of employees (FTE). Market concentration is the Hirschmann-Her￿ndahl-Index based on number of branches in the economic region ("ROR"). Merger activity
is a dummy indicating a merger in year t. Interest rate is the average 1y-EURIBOR for year t. Weak area is a dummy indicating that the city/county belongs to the lowest quartile in
terms of GDP per capita. Rural area indicates that the city/county belongs to the lowest quartile with regard to population density. Population density is the number of inhabitants
per square kilometer in thousands. GDP growth is the year-to-year growth of GDP denoted in percent. The subsample weak majority consists of all banks in electoral districts where
the obtained votes of the two major parties do not di￿er by more than 10%. The subsample strong majority consist of all banks in electoral districts where one of the parties possess an
absolute majority of more than 50% of the votes. The R2 for all probit regressions is a pseudo-R2 based on the likelihood estimators.
Branch closure Employee reduction Extraordinary expenses Growth total loans
Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Election period -0.1039 -0.2043 -0.2447*** -0.1154 0.0408*** 0.0291** 0.1143 0.0102
Total assets 0.4735*** 0.4300*** -0.1138** 0.0471 0.0165*** 0.0152* -0.1523 -0.3467
Growth total assets -0.0224* -0.0164 -0.0820*** -0.0288** -0.0008 -0.0048**
Operating expenses / total assets 0.0779 0.1361 0.0647 0.6083 0.0940*** 0.0540* -1.6949* -0.8227
Loan loss reserves / total assets -0.0099 0.0710 -0.0055 0.2163*** 0.0040 -0.0023 -0.3932*** -0.6461***
Return on assets -0.1301 -0.5239*** -0.5030*** -0.3582** 0.2534*** 0.2101*** 1.9438** 2.8161***
Equity ratio -0.0192*** -0.0189** -0.6151** -0.3651*
Total assets / employee 0.0001 0.0004**
Market concentration (HHI) 1.3269 0.2756 2.4586*** 1.7621 -0.1401* -0.3209** 2.1058 2.3729
Merger activity -0.3077 -0.5027* -0.2785 0.1800 0.0483*** 0.0587** -0.7550 -0.3132
Weak region 0.0529 -0.0792 0.0016 0.1485 0.0062 -0.0058 0.9925** 0.3244
GDP growth 0.0008 0.0211 0.0316** -0.0050 0.0002 -0.0008 0.0413 -0.0831
Rural region 0.1738 0.3442*** -0.0695 0.1374 0.0119 0.0198 0.5686 -1.1971***
Interest rates 1.0158*** 1.3153***
Constant -4.2092*** -3.5862*** -0.0810 -4.6930*** -0.3329*** -0.1197 6.0818* 5.1603*
Observations 1,226 981 1,226 986 1,225 986 976 873
Number of bank 189 146 189 147 189 147 187 143
Chi2 139 103.94 176.18 145.89
p(Chi2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.47 0.45 0.2 0.32
Notes: Robust standard errors and time-speci￿c e￿ects not reported. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
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58 Conclusion
Focusing on elections as major political events, we show in this paper that the
state-owned savings banks in Germany are in￿uenced by local politics, i.e. we
show that savings banks signi￿cantly change their business behavior in the
context of local elections on city and county level. This is the ￿rst time that
direct political in￿uence can be shown for one of the major developed banking
market. The large sample size of over 5,000 observations including over 1,250
elections over a period of 13 years, the inclusion of time and bank/city/county
speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects as well as an extensive set of control variables ensures the
robustness of the results. A further bene￿t of the analysis is the homogenous
regulatory and legal background of all banks, which minimizes the problem of
potential omitted variables as eminent in cross-country studies.
In a ￿rst step we use ￿xed-e￿ect probit and OLS regressions to understand
how elections change the behavior of the associated savings banks. We ob-
tain ￿ve key results on the basic relationship between business behavior and
elections: Firstly, the likelihood of savings banks to close a local branch is
signi￿cantly lower (by about 18% for an average bank) around an election.
Secondly, the probability that savings banks lay-o￿ some of their employees
drops by 17% during elections for an average bank. At the same time the
probability to hire new personnel increases by 25% on average. Thirdly, there
is also a signi￿cantly lower likelihood of mergers around elections for banks lo-
cated in Western Germany, which even decreases further once distressed banks
(which might be forced into a merger to prevent imminent bankruptcy) are
eliminated. Fourthly, savings banks tend to spend on average EUR 560,000
on extraordinary activities more than during other years. This equals ap-
proximately 15% of average extraordinary expenses and 12% of average net
income. Although we cannot see the real bene￿ciaries of these spendings, it
can be assumed that they re￿ect additional support to cultural and other so-
cietal activities and institutions. Finally, we con￿rm ￿ndings of Dinc (2005)
that state-owned banks tend to grant more loans around elections, to both
corporate and private clients.
To better understand the circumstances that facilitate political in￿uence we
conduct some further analyses and yield three main insights: ￿rstly, political
in￿uence seems to be lower in economically weaker areas. Secondly, pro￿table
banks are more prone to political in￿uence than less pro￿table banks. Finally,
political in￿uence seems to be stronger when political majorities are narrow
and lower when one of the parties possesses an absolute majority.
Our analyses also provides some insights into the public duty of state-owned
savings banks. The coe￿cients of our control variables suggest that savings
banks are less likely to close branches in economically weak areas. At the same
36time we ￿nd clear evidence that ￿nancially strong and e￿cient banks are less
likely to close branches and lay-o￿ employees, i.e. are better able to ful￿ll the
second part of their dual mission, supporting the development of the local city
or county.
Our ￿ndings clearly show that political in￿uence on state-owned banks is not
only a phenomenon of developing countries with a weak legal system. We
provide ample evidence consistent with the political view of government own-
ership of banks: the presented relationships between elections and changes in
business behavior of savings banks are strong indications of potential political
in￿uence on these banks. However, there are many more interesting questions
for further research in this ￿eld, e.g.: how costly is political in￿uence to the
public? What is the relationship between political in￿uence and operating e￿-
ciency, i.e. are banks with stronger political ties less e￿cient? 34 How successful
is political in￿uence, i.e. has the behavior of banks a measureable impact on
election results? Does political in￿uence di￿er if the particular bank is owned
by more than one city or county (in line with Memmel and Stein (2005))?
34 An et al. (2007) show for Korea that banks with close political ties are less e￿cient.
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Table 12: Description of dependent and explanatory variables
Variables Description
Dependent variables
Branch closure Dummy equals one if number of branches is lower than in
previous year.
Employee reduction Dummy equals one if number of employees more than 1% lower
than in previous year.
Employee increase Dummy equals one if number of employees more than 1%
higher than in previous year.
Merger activity Dummy equals one if bank merged with other bank in partic-
ular year t.
Extraordinary expenses Extraordinary expenses as percentage of total assets. Extraor-
dinary expenses include especially donations and funds used
for societal activities, e.g. sponsoring of local sport teams or
cultural events.(DSGV, 2005)
Growth volume total loans Percentage change of average total loan volume from t-1 to t
excluding loans to other ￿nancial institutions.
Growth volume corporate loans Percentage change of average corporate loan volume from t-1
to t excluding mortgages.
Growth volume private loans Percentage change of average loan volume to consumers from
t-1 to t including mortgages.
Explanatory variables
Election Dummy indicating an election in year t. Election year is the
same calendar year if an election is held in the second half
of this year or the previous calendar year if election is held
in the ￿rst half of the year. With regard to employee changes
and merger activities we include the year following the election
year to take into account the delay between announcement and
re￿ection in o￿cial ￿nancial statements.(Dinc, 2005)
Bank speci￿cs
Total assets Logarithm of total assets (in million Euros) to proxy for size
of bank.(Dinc, 2005)
Growth total assets Percentage change of average total assets from t-1 to t.
Operating expenses / total assets Total operating expenses over total assets in year t as proxy
for average e￿ciency of bank.
Loan loss reserves / total assets Total loan loss reserves (stock item) over total assets in year
t as proxy for riskiness of current loan portfolio.
Return on assets Income before taxes over total assets as proxy for bank’s prof-
itability. For analysis on extraordinary expenses we add back
extraordinary expenses: (income before taxes+extraordinary
expenses)/total assets.
Equity ratio Total equity over total assets as proxy for both riskiness of
bank and risk attitude of management.
Deposit-to-loan ratio Total deposits over total loans to non-banks. Proxies for the
availability to fund local investment opportunities through de-
posits.
38Table 12: Description of dependent and explanatory variables
Variables Description
Total assets/branch Average total assets (in million Euros) in t over number of
branches at year end. Proxies for the average size of an average
branch, i.e. whether business is conducted more centralized or
more decentralized.
Employees/branch Average number of employees in t over number of branches at
year end. Alternative proxy for the size of an average branch,
i.e. whether business is conducted more centralized or more
decentralized.
Accounts/employee Number of current accounts over total number of employees
as proxy for labor e￿ciency.
Market structure
Market concentration (HHI) Hirschmann-Her￿ndahl-Index of concentration based on the
number of branches of each bank in the county or city. Proxy
for potential competition in the local market.
Macroeconomics
Interest rate Average 1y-EURIBOR rate to control for general interest rate
level.
Weak area Dummy indicating that bank in located in a county or city
belonging to the lowest quartile with regard to GDP per capita
in t.
GDP growth Year-on-year growth of GDP in county or city where the bank
is located in.
Rural area Dummy indicating that bank in located in a county or city
belonging to the lowest quartile with regard to inhabitants
per square kilometer in t.
Population density Inhabitants per square kilometer used as alternative proxy for
rural area.
39Table 13
Correlation matrix of explanatory variables
See table 12 for description of the variables.
Total as-
sets
Growth
total
assets
Operating
expenses
/ total
assets
Loan loss
reserves
/ total
assets
Return
on assets
Equity
ratio
Deposit-
to-loan-
ratio
Employees
/ branch
Market
concen-
tration
(HHI)
Merger
activity
Weak
area
GDP
growth
Rural
area
Total assets 1.000
Growth total
assets -0.065 1.000
Operating ex-
penses / total
assets -0.326 -0.043 1.000
Loan loss re-
serves / total
assets 0.047 -0.229 -0.050 1.000
Return on as-
sets -0.131 0.348 0.014 -0.125 1.000
Equity ratio 0.007 -0.209 -0.040 -0.143 0.028 1.000
Deposit-to-
loan-ratio -0.023 -0.035 0.171 0.228 -0.005 -0.361 1.000
Employees /
branch 0.121 -0.057 -0.004 0.088 -0.076 0.040 -0.131 1.000
Market concen-
tration (HHI) 0.110 -0.040 0.075 0.157 -0.002 -0.236 0.480 -0.247 1.000
Merger activity 0.152 -0.029 -0.010 -0.017 -0.102 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.001 1.000
Weak area -0.195 -0.024 0.219 0.124 0.031 -0.184 0.331 -0.102 0.428 -0.035 1.000
GDP growth -0.016 -0.020 -0.014 0.065 -0.038 -0.043 0.155 -0.043 0.065 -0.005 0.015 1.000
Rural area -0.230 -0.028 0.085 -0.111 0.014 -0.016 0.148 -0.278 0.312 -0.023 0.322 0.021 1.000
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